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Introduction and summary
Figure 1 shows the level of inflation in the U.S. econ-
omy (measured as the percentage growth in the gross
domestic product or GDP deflator over the previous
four quarters) from 1951 to 2003. The general pattern
is familiar to many of us: The level of inflation was
successively low and not very variable (in the 1950s
and 1960s), high and variable (in the 1970s), and low
and not variable again (since the 1980s).
The graph is divided into five sections, by tenure
of the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System: William McC. Martin
(1951–70), Arthur Burns (1970–78), G. William Miller
(1978–79), Paul Volcker (1979–87), and Alan Greenspan
(since 1987). While the exact degree of control of a
central bank over the level of prices is a matter of de-
bate, the conventional wisdom assigns a major role
to these individuals in the rise and fall in inflation.
In particular, the fact that inflation has been low
since the 1980s has been credited to the efforts of
Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan.
This article surveys the recent literature motivat-
ed by the following question: To what extent does
the pattern of figure 1 reflect the actions of these
individuals? In particular, what caused the high
inflation in the 1970s, and is the low inflation of the
1990s due to a change in policy, as the conventional
wisdom suggests?
I analyze the competing stories in the literature
along one particular dimension. One story, which I
call the bad-policy story, blames the policymakers
for the inflation of the 1970s, and sees a decisive
(and permanent) break around 1980. It is an optimis-
tic story that relies on errors made and lessons well
learned, and it reflects the conventional wisdom.
This would be the “poor play” in the title above.
Against this story of successful learning, I place an
array of alternatives under the label of bad-luck sto-
ries: They share less emphasis on learning, ranging
from imperfect learning by policymakers to no learn-
ing at all. Correspondingly, they place more empha-
sis on the role of (bad) luck in shaping the pattern of
inflation in the past 50 years. This is the “poor hand”
scenario.
So far, the analysis of the evidence for the bad-
policy stories has taken place along one dimension,
namely, the time-series properties of inflation and other
macroeconomic series. Furthermore, the debate has
turned around the effort to detect a change in policy.
The competing hypothesis (emphasizing the role of
luck) is that the nature of the randomness affecting
the economy, and not the behavior of the central
bank, is what has changed over time.
The empirical debate is not settled, but some com-
mon ground appears to be emerging, allowing for a
measure of both changes in policy and changes in the
luck faced by policymakers. We still have some way
to go in understanding the quantitative importance,
and the sources, of both types of changes.
The bad-policy story: Narrative and
a subtext
I first present an exaggerated version of the narrative
in DeLong (1997). The force of the bad-policy story,
as it accounts for the rise and fall of inflation, is that
policy was poor, then improved. Thus, the narrative
relies strongly on learning over time and on the power
of ideas, to which I turn later.35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
A narrative
DeLong notes that the U.S. has known inflation
at various times in its history, but that the 1970s was
its only peacetime inflation. Wars and inflation have
been associated for centuries, because printing mon-
ey is a cheap way for governments to raise revenues
during a major fiscal emergency without raising tax-
es explicitly. No such emergency seems to explain
the “Great Inflation,” as DeLong calls the inflation
of the 1970s. In other words, it cannot be excused as
part of a time-honored tradition in public finance.1
What, then, explains it?
DeLong’s narrative unfolds in three acts. In
Act I (the 1950s), the Fed, newly liberated from its
wartime obligation to support the Treasury’s debt-
management policy by the Treasury Accord of 1951,
follows a prudent policy and maintains relatively low
inflation after the lifting of wartime price controls and
the pressures of financing the Korean War. A sense of
foreboding haunts the scene, because of the shadow cast
by the great macroeconomic event that dominates the
twentieth century (and indeed, gave birth to macroeco-
nomics as a field of economics), the Great Depression.
Unemployment reached such unprecedented levels that
it ceased to be tolerated as an inevitable side effect of
business cycles. Unemployment, except perhaps for
1 percent or so of frictional unemployment,
came to be viewed as both cyclical and,
perhaps, curable. At the close of Act I,
enter the villains, carrying with them the
promise of a cure for unemployment,
namely inflation. The villains, in this nar-
rative, are Samuelson and Solow, whose
1960 article held out the tantalizing possi-
bility of achieving lower unemployment
at the cost of apparently modest permanent
increases in inflation.
In Act II, Fed Chairman Martin2 ceded
to the temptation to use inflation, and over
the course of the 1960s unemployment
fell and inflation rose. However, by 1969
unemployment had only fallen to 4 percent,
while inflation was reaching 6 percent,
somewhat worse terms than those prom-
ised by Samuelson and Solow. The next
year, Martin left Burns with a set of unpleas-
ant choices, among which Burns couldn’t
or wouldn’t make the harder one. Burns
appears like a figure from a Greek trage-
dy, aware of his situation but unable to re-
solve it. Christiano and Gust (2000) cite
Burns recognizing in 1974 that “policies
that create excess aggregate demand, and
thereby drive up wage rates and prices, will not re-
sult in any lasting reduction in unemployment.” Thus,
Burns was arguing against the Samuelson–Solow
remedy—yet he did not take action to prevent the
1970s inflation.
DeLong cites a number of extenuating circum-
stances in favor of Burns: political pressures from the
White House, difficulties in appreciating the inflation
problem due to the price controls of the early 1970s,
and pervasive failures to forecast inflation, including
on the part of the private sector. But Burns and other
policymakers simply were not willing to accept the
costs of disinflation. Christiano and Gust (2000) again
cite Burns fearing “the outcry of an enraged citizenry”
in response to attempts at stabilizing inflation. Taylor
(1997) adds that, by the late 1970s, the costs of disin-
flation appeared too high to policymakers. He cites
Perry (1978) showing that a 1 percent fall in inflation
would require a 10 percent fall in GDP and conclud-
ing, “whatever view is held on the urgency of slowing
inflation today, it is unrealistic to believe that the pub-
lic or its representatives would permit the extended
period of high unemployment required to slow infla-
tion in this manner.”
Act III brings redemption: Inflation reaches such
heights in 1979–80 that the newly appointed Volcker
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has what none of his predecessors did, a political man-
date to stop inflation. The rest is well known: A first
attempt at raising rates was reversed with the onset of
the 1980 recession, but the second attempt, initially met
with incredulity, succeeded in purging the economy
of its inflationary expectations. This coincided with
the 1982 recession, which, costly as it was, did not reach
the depths Perry might have expected on the basis of
his estimates. In the event, a committed central banker
whose anti-inflationary stance became trusted could
permanently alter inflationary expectations, without
having to purchase low inflation at the cost of high
unemployment.
The crisis of Act II, America’s peacetime inflation,
carries an air of inevitability, but this was only because
of the intellectual climate shared by economists and poli-
ticians. Policymakers worked with an incorrect model
of the economy, and the consequences of their actions
led them to recognize the error of their ways. Having
acquired a correct model of the economy, policymakers
proceeded to implement an optimal policy. In this
view, the Great Inflation of the 1970s is simply a re-
sult of poor policy.
Subtext: The power of learning
The bad-policy narrative is all about learning from
past mistakes. It relies on policymakers’ beliefs, but the
driving force is ultimately located in academia, perhaps
not surprisingly for a story told by academics.3 I review
the concomitant intellectual developments, using
progress in the discipline of economics as a gauge
of social learning.
Policymakers, in this view, had been searching for
an appropriate monetary policy in the absence of the
strict constraints that the gold standard had imposed until
1934. In the aftermath of World War II, the Bretton
Woods system had been created, and it still meant to
impose some constraints, albeit weaker than the pure
gold standard. In the 1950s, policymakers still viewed
price stability as their main objective, even if they were
conscious of the possible stimulus that they could de-
liver via inflation.
Then the academic climate changed. A. W. Phillips
discovered his famous curve (the Phillips curve) by
plotting a century’s worth of wage growth data against
unemployment in the UK. Samuelson and Solow (1960)
reproduced the plot with U.S. data. They stylized the
rather nebulous scatter-plot into a neat downward-sloping
graph of inflation against unemployment (by subtract-
ing average productivity growth from wage growth)
and suggested a “menu of choice between different
degrees of unemployment and price stability.” One could
pick price stability with 5.5 percent unemployment,
or one could go for the “nonperfectionist’s goal” of 3
percent at the cost of 4 percent to 5 percent unemploy-
ment. The lesson that policymakers took from this work
is that permanent increases in inflation of a moderate
magnitude could purchase significant reductions in
unemployment.
Samuelson and Solow have become the villains
of the story. It is true that they propose this menu, but
they are also insistent that it is only for the short term,
and recognize that the terms of the trade-off could shift
over time.4 Conversely, in DeLong’s narrative, the
Great Depression made people think of all unemploy-
ment as curable. That is, monetary policy’s failure to
act in the 1930s convinced a later generation of mon-
etary policy’s power to act. This somewhat paradoxical
view may have something to do with the considerable
influence of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who made
a strong case for the Fed’s responsibility in worsening,
if not causing, the Great Depression. When it comes
to looking for accomplices in the Great Inflation, these
authors are not rounded up with the usual suspects.
Be that as it may, the late 1960s and early 1970s
saw an acceleration in inflation with no permanent
reduction in unemployment, and ultimately the attempt
to exploit the trade-off embodied in the Phillips curve
resulted in stagflation, an incomprehensible combination
of high unemployment and high inflation. Adverse
supply shocks such as the oil price shocks of 1973
and 1979 compounded but did not create the problem.
For DeLong, the exact timing is rather immaterial: The
Great Inflation was an “accident waiting to happen,”
once the Great Depression had revealed the disease
and Samuelson and Solow had revealed the cure.
Meanwhile, in academia, the foundations were laid
for the next stage. Once again, academics led the way,
first with the rebuttal of the traditional Phillips curve
by Phelps (1968) and Friedman (1968), who insisted
that, in the long run, there could be no trade-off, only
varying levels of inflation with the same “natural” un-
employment rate. The argument was that only unan-
ticipated inflation could have real effects: Perfectly
anticipated inflation would simply be built into nominal
wage growth, the way it would be built into nominal
interest rates. Attempts at exploiting the illusory trade-
off would only achieve the natural rate, but with high
levels of inflation. The argument was formalized by
Lucas (1972).
Empirical tests of the natural-rate hypothesis took
the form of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
The Phillips curve equation now related the growth
of wages with expected inflation, in addition to un-
employment. The test was as follows: If the coefficient
on expected inflation was found to be less than one,37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
then the Friedman theory would be rejected. Since
inflation would not feed in one-for-one into wage
growth and neutralize the Phillips curve, there would
still be room for nominal wage growth to decrease
unemployment.
For the purpose of empirically testing the natural-
rate hypothesis, expectations (which are not measured
directly) were represented as a distributed lag (or weight-
ed average of past values) of inflation. This presented
an identification problem, however: Without further
assumptions, there is no way to disentangle the weights
on past values of inflation from the coefficient on ex-
pected inflation that multiplies them all. In other words,
if regressing wage growth on past inflation gave a low
value, one could not determine if this reflected a low
impact of inflation expectations on wage growth, or a
low impact of past inflation on inflation expectations.
An additional assumption was justified by the
following reasoning. Suppose that the government set
a permanent level of inflation. Over time, one would
expect agents to adjust their expectations to that per-
manent level. This meant that the sum of weights on
past inflation should equal one. With this assumption,
researchers such as Solow and Tobin empirically found
a coefficient on expected inflation less than one and
rejected the natural-rate hypothesis.
Then, in the early 1970s, two things happened.
First, Sargent (1971) pointed out how the identifying
assumption was valid only for certain inflation pro-
cesses and not others. If the inflation process is highly
persistent (for example, when inflation is constant),
then expected inflation, under rational expectations,
can indeed be approximated by a distributed lag with
coefficients summing to one. With one lag, for example,
the coefficient is one: If inflation is extremely persis-
tent, agents expect inflation tomorrow to be very much
like inflation today, and lagged inflation represents
expected inflation adequately. If, however, the govern-
ment tends to fight inflation when it arises, then higher
inflation today signals lower inflation tomorrow. With
one lag, the coefficient would be less than one, and
might even be negative. Put simply, how agents form
expectations about inflation depends on how inflation
behaves, and if the behavior of inflation changes, so
will their expectations.
Second, as if on cue, the data began to change.
As shown in figure 1, inflation became more persistent.
This led to different results, and the coefficient on in-
flation came closer to one, making the natural-rate
hypothesis more plausible even to Solow and Tobin.
Ironically, inflation expectations now appeared to be
persistent or “inertial.” This led to the notion that they
could only be reduced by a very prolonged bout of
disinflation, which the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve predicted would be very costly in terms of out-
put. The “sacrifice ratio” (cost of disinflation in terms
of lost output) was by the late 1970s estimated to be
prohibitively high. This, argues Taylor (1997), contrib-
uted to policymakers’ willingness to tolerate increasing
levels of inflation.
Sargent’s point relates to a key step in the history
of ideas, namely the Lucas (1976) critique of economet-
ric policy evaluation as currently practiced. One cannot
evaluate alternative policies on the basis of outcomes
achieved under a particular policy, unless one explicitly
takes into account how that policy was incorporated
in private agents’ decisions. A change in policy will
lead to changes in agents’ behavior that may well in-
validate the econometric model that recommended
the change in the first place. The Lucas critique taught
policymakers that their actions could alter the terms
of a trade-off they imagined were fixed.
The Lucas critique, among other things, forcefully
directed attention to the role of expectations, especially
private agents’ expectations of future government policy.
The recognition that expectations can’t be systematically
fooled or manipulated places great discipline on eco-
nomic theory. The consequences were drawn in many
different settings, and one of those was government
policy as a control problem in the face of rational ex-
pectations (Kydland and Prescott, 1977, and Calvo,
1978). The expectations-augmented Phillips curve still
left central bankers with the possibility of stimulating
the economy with surprise inflation. But these models
warned central bankers that the public was well aware
of this temptation, and that, unless they could find a
credible way to resist it, they would always be expect-
ed to cede to it. Well-meaning central bankers could
find themselves with high inflation but nothing better
than the natural rate of unemployment.
Alternative stories: Bad luck, traps,
imperfect learning
I now present alternative stories that have been
provided, or could be provided, for the events under
discussion. These alternatives draw from some of the
work that I reviewed above.
Expectations and the trap of time-inconsistency
One line of thought stems from the Kydland and
Prescott (1977) analysis. In the bad-policy analysis,
the goal has been to alert central bankers to a temptation
they face—the rationale being that by becoming con-
scious of the temptation, they are somehow better placed
to resist it. Yet the analysis itself is essentially time-
invariant: It describes a temptation that was always
there, always will be there, and cannot be resisted.38 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
The ingredients of the model are a government and
a private sector. The private sector makes forecasts of
the government’s inflation policy and has rational ex-
pectations. The government has a correct model of
the economy (an expectations-augmented Phillips
curve) and tries its best to minimize both inflation
and unemployment.5
The expectations-augmented Phillips curve says
that the central bank can lower unemployment by en-
gineering a surprise inflation, that is, choosing a level
of inflation higher than the one the private sector an-
ticipated. But, in the analysis, the private sector is
well aware of that temptation—hence its expectations
of inflation will be higher. In an equilibrium where
the private agents have rational expectations (a prop-
erty of equilibrium that is seen as requisite since Lucas’s
1976 critique), the central bank’s attempt to set infla-
tion high will be forecasted, and there will be no sur-
prise—hence an unemployment rate no lower than the
natural rate, but a higher level of inflation. How is that
level of inflation determined? It must be such that the
central bank has no incentive to deviate from what the
public expects: In other words, the inflation rate must
be high enough to make the benefits of even higher in-
flation, in terms of unemployment, unworthwhile.6 This
level of inflation will depend on the natural rate of un-
employment: The higher the natural rate of unemploy-
ment, the higher inflation must be to dissuade the
central banker from trying to reduce unemployment
This prediction of the model has been used to ex-
plain the rise and fall of inflation as merely mirroring
the rise and fall of the natural rate of unemployment,
a phenomenon itself purely driven by factors outside
the Fed’s control, such as changes in the structure of
the economy (for example, demographic changes or
changes to the labor markets). The idea was proposed
by Parkin (1993) and tested empirically by Ireland
(1999). Ireland draws the implications of the model
for the comovements of inflation and the natural rate
and finds that, at least in terms of their long-run rela-
tionship, they are supported by the data. The short-run
implications fare less well, a failure that can plausibly
be assigned to the extreme simplicity of the model.7
In this story, then, nothing has been learned: In-
flation is lower not because central bankers do a better
job of resisting the temptation to inflate, but rather
because the equilibrium level of inflation that results
from their yielding to the temptation is lower, for
reasons outside their control. The Kydland–Prescott
model implicitly points to institutional changes, in a
rather vague way, as the only solution to the dilemma.
If central bankers have the ability to commit, or tie their
hands, they can deprive themselves of the option to
yield to the temptation, much as Ulysses tied to the mast
of his ship (at his request) is unable to jump out of
the ship and follow the call of the Sirens. As DeLong
(1997) has noted, while talk of central bank indepen-
dence has gained importance because of the Kydland–
Prescott arguments, no institutional change can be
identified that has given the Fed a better ability to
commit since 1979.
There is a variant of the Kydland–Prescott story,
starting with Barro and Gordon (1983), that uses rep-
utation as an ersatz commitment mechanism. What a
commitment mechanism achieves is to narrow the
expectations of the private sector down to a unique,
and desirable, action by the central bank. Game theory
suggests that, in repeated situations, there are other
(noncooperative) ways to support a narrow set of ex-
pectations. The private sector’s behavior now takes
the following form: As long as the central bank con-
forms to its expectations and behaves well (by not in-
flating), those expectations will be continued. But if
the central bank deviates and allows itself to cede to
the temptation of a surprise inflation only once, then
the private sector will expect it henceforth always to
cede. And, given such expectations, the central bank
has no incentive to refute them, because doing so would
be costly in terms of the Phillips curve. Economists
call “reputation” a set of expectations, consistent with
past behavior, that creates incentives for future behav-
ior. Should the reputation be lost, the private sector’s
expectations would coerce the central bank into the
high-inflation outcome forever. The very threat of such
a dire punishment can be sufficient to keep the central
bank in the desirable outcome.
This story alone, focusing as it does on sustaining
the good outcome, will not explain bad outcomes such
as America’s peacetime inflation. But it can be modi-
fied to do so, because as it turns out, the threat of losing
one’s reputation can maintain all sorts of behavior,
not just the best. In this spirit, Chari, Christiano, and
Eichenbaum (1998) have proposed a model (extended
in Christiano and Gust 2000; see also Leduc 2003)
where the behavior supported by the fear of losing
one’s reputation can be quite arbitrary. They illustrate
this with a “sunspot” equilibrium, which they think
can be used to explain the rise of inflation in the 1970s.
The private sector’s behavior now has two components:
One is that the central bank’s deviations from the pri-
vate sector’s expectations toward high money growth
are “punished” by a loss of reputation as before; the
other is that these expectations are now assumed to
be driven by “sunspots,” that is, random events that
have no direct relevance for the economy. Thus, for
random reasons, the private sector suddenly believes39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
that the central bank will increase inflation this period,
and sets prices in advance accordingly. Once those
expectations are in place, the central bank has no choice
but to validate them: Producing lower inflation would
be costly in terms of output, producing higher infla-
tion would be costly in terms of reputation.8 Chari,
Christiano, and Eichenbaum call such equilibria
“expectation traps.”
Such models suffer from some limitations. Pre-
cisely because the threat of losing one’s reputation is
a powerful incentive, the model has weak predictions.
A given strategy of the central bank will be an equi-
librium of the model as long as the pay-off to the cen-
tral bank of sticking with the strategy is greater than
the pay-off of deviating once and being punished
thereafter. Since the latter pay-off is just a number,
many strategies will be equilibria for the central bank,
and a whole range of behavior is potentially predict-
ed by the model. Moreover, the model makes state-
ments about outcomes, not about specific strategies
or beliefs. In particular, it shows that if any deviation
from the private sector’s expectations on the part of
the central bank is punished by a loss of reputation,
then those expectations will be fulfilled. But it does
not say where those expectations come from in the
first place. Finally, the rise and fall of inflation is ex-
plained, in such a model, by rising and falling expec-
tations of what the central bank will do. Many other
patterns of inflation could have been explained in
just the same way.
The Lucas critique taken seriously
Just as Kydland and Prescott’s paper suggested
one alternative story, another key development in mac-
roeconomics suggests the second, namely the Lucas
critique, taken to its logical conclusion. Lucas critiqued
the then-current practice of using past data to estimate
the response of the economy to past policies and then
using these numbers to evaluate its response to alter-
native, future policies. He argued that one ought to
take expectations into account explicitly: The past
behavior of the economy was premised on the belief
that particular policies were being followed. If new
policies were substituted, the beliefs would change,
and the response of the economy would be different.
Only more careful modeling of the economy, based
on “deep” parameters invariant to policy changes and
on correct modeling of expectations, can be logically
coherent. Once the deep parameters are estimated, an
alternative policy can be evaluated, with a new set of
expectations on the part of the private sector govern-
ing the new response of the economy.
But, as Sargent (1984) and Sims (1988) pointed
out, there is an inconsistency in this procedure. In the
estimation phase, it assumes that agents took past poli-
cies as fixed forever, and in the evaluation phase, it
assumes that they will take the new policies as fixed
forever. The mooted change in policy is thus totally
unanticipated ex ante, but entirely credible ex post.
Shouldn’t the logic of the Lucas critique be carried to
its conclusion? If so, the change in policy itself should
be modeled, and agents assumed to assign some prob-
ability to the change taking place. How do agents as-
sign a probability to various policy changes? Knowing
their policymaker, they should be figuring out what
he intends to do: Thus, agents should have a model
of the policymaker’s choice of policy. But this has
the effect of sucking the policymaker, the economic
adviser, the econometrician, and ultimately, the modeler
into the model.
Sims (1988) argues for a route out of this conun-
drum, essentially by modeling the policymaker as an
optimizing agent with somewhat less information than
the private sector at each point in time and, therefore,
committing slight policy errors each time. This leaves
room for econometric estimation of the economy’s
response, and policy advice predicated on this estima-
tion, that is logically consistent. The government acts,
making slight mistakes: This generates outcomes that
the government observes and uses to refine its estimate
of the parameters of the economy. But this view does
not allow major changes in policy, and ultimately any
reasonable econometric procedure will rapidly lead
to a good estimate of the parameters, with no further
learning taking place. Using this view to look at the
inflation of the 1970s leads one to a slightly Panglos-
sian9 but coherent view. The Fed, whatever it did, was
doing the best it could. Inflation in the 1970s and the
early 1980s might seem high to us, but it could have
been worse.10
Another potential escape from the conundrum is
to model the policymaker as randomly switching be-
tween regimes, with the probabilities of switching be-
tween regimes fixed and known to the private sector
(Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon, 1984). Leeper and Zha
(2001) develop this idea to model “modest” policy inter-
ventions as small but significant actions that do not
lead agents to revise their beliefs as to which regime
is currently in place. In the context of our question,
this variant does leave room for major changes in
policy, but now only as unexplainable random changes.
None of these theories are really proposed as ex-
planations for the behavior of U.S. inflation. I present
them because they play an important role in the de-
bate on the empirical evidence described below. In40 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
particular, they underlie several researchers’ thinking
about monetary policy. Anyone who tends to subscribe
to these views will be inclined to look for empirical
evidence that sustains the bad-luck view, since policy
is never bad.
Imperfect learning
Both the Kydland–Prescott view and the Sims–
Leeper–Zha view leave no room for learning—either
because the central bank is trapped in its dilemma, or
else because the central bank has always been doing
the best it could, or because it is just randomly changing
policy. The two views, of course, are mutually compati-
ble: It may well be that the best the central bank can
do is the outcome dictated by the Kydland–Prescott
analysis. Both views ultimately will rely on some ex-
ternal variation in the economy (like a rising, then falling,
natural rate, or a sequence of bad shocks in the 1970s
and 1980s) to account for the rise and fall of inflation.
To generate the rise and fall within the model itself,
without overly counting on external factors, Sargent
(1999) reintroduces some amount of learning, but not
a lot; not enough, at any rate, to restore the bright op-
timism of the bad-policy story. This is our third alter-
native story.
Sargent starts from the Kydland–Prescott model,
but rather than viewing the government as having a
correct model but less information than the private sec-
tor as Sims does, he views it as observing all relevant
information, but having an incorrect model. The poli-
cymaker tries to do his best, based on his beliefs about
the parameters of his (incorrect) model. His actions
then generate outcomes, which he observes and uses
to update his estimates of the parameters. Furthermore,
the policymaker tends to pay more attention to more
recent observations.11 Sargent studies the dynamics
of the economy and finds that the policymaker’s be-
liefs about an exploitable Phillips curve oscillate over
time. There are periods where the parameters that he
estimates makes him think that there is no trade-off
to exploit, followed by periods where normal random
fluctuations in the data suddenly open up the possibili-
ty of a trade-off: The policymaker attempts to exploit
it, raising inflation without lowering unemployment.
This creates new data, which again dissuades the pol-
icymaker from the idea of a trade-off. Because the
policymaker tends to discount more distant observa-
tions, this can occur again and again.
The degree of persistence of inflation plays a par-
ticular role in Sargent’s story, one that connects to its
role in the 1970s tests of the Phillips curve. Beliefs about
the natural-rate hypothesis derive from the degree of
persistence—the more persistence in inflation, the
more readily policymakers will accept the natural-rate
hypothesis and give up on their attempts to exploit
the trade-off. That is why measuring the variation of
persistence over time is a key element to make Sargent’s
learning story plausible.
The evidence
What does the evidence say? In recent years, a
body of literature has emerged that attempts to address
a preliminary question. To assert that either policy or
luck explains the rise and fall in inflation, a necessary
condition would be to determine that either policy or
luck has changed over the relevant period. Two im-
portant concepts underlie almost all of the empirical
work that has been carried out to make that determi-
nation. I first review the tools and then present what
has been found. Did policy change, or luck, or both?
The tools
The first important concept is the “Taylor rule.”
This is a formulation of an interest-rate setting poli-
cy, introduced by Taylor (1993a, 1993b), who argued
that it was both desirable for a central bank to follow
and a good approximate description of policies followed
in practice. The basic Taylor rule describes the inter-
est rate as a linear function of deviations of output
and inflation from some prescribed target. Although
Taylor (1993b) showed that it was a good first-order
approximation of the Fed’s actual behavior, it has
since been recognized that, in practice, the Fed engages
in more “interest-rate smoothing” than can be account-
ed for with a simple Taylor rule, which would predict
a more variable level of interest rates. Consequently,
current formulations are as follows. First, it is assumed
that the Fed has at all times a target for the fed funds
rate but does not act to reach that target immediately;
rather, it adjusts at some speed toward that target. The
actual rate is somewhere between that target rate and
an average of its recent values. This assumption cap-
tures the Fed’s interest rate smoothing behavior. How
is this target determined? The target rate is a linear
function of the deviations of expected inflation and
the output gap from their own targets. In the literature
I present, monetary policy is viewed in terms of a
Taylor rule.
The second concept is vector autoregression (VAR),
which is used to analyze the dynamic relationships
between stochastic, or random variables (Sims, 1980).
To motivate its use, consider the problem of estimat-
ing the statistical relationship between two variables,
say inflation πt and output Yt. We suppose that infla-
tion in the current period is related to the output gap
in the same period, but we imagine (say, because of
inertia) that it also depends on inflation and output last41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
period (this dependence over time is what the term
“dynamic” refers to). So we have in mind a linear
relation of the form:
1) πt = a Yt + b πt–1 + cYt–1 + ut,
where we assume that ut is unrelated to anything in
the past. The problem with any attempt at measuring
a and b is that the variable Yt itself may be related to
the error term ut, either because inflation also affects
output or because of some common factor affecting
both. This endogeneity induces a simultaneous equa-
tion problem. It means that a variable appearing on
the right-hand side should also appear on the left-hand
side of another equation:
2) Yt = d πt + e πt–1  + f Yt–1 + vt.
We still have variables appearing on both sides
of the equal sign, but a little algebra fixes the problem:
multiply equation 2 by a, subtract from equation 1,
and divide by 1 – ad to get
3) πt = (b + af)/(1 – ad) πt–1 + (c + ae)/(1 – ad) Yt–1 +
(ut + a vt)/(1 – ad).
A similar manipulation will give
4) Yt = + (f + bd)/(1 – ad) πt–1 + (e + cd)/(1 – ac) Yt–1 +
(dut + vt)/(1 – ad).
We now have inflation and output expressed as
linear functions of past inflation and output, which
are independent of ut and vt. The combined system
(equations 3 and 4) is called a vector autoregression,
because it expresses the dependence of the vector
Xt = [πt Yt] on its past value Xt–1:
5) Xt = A Xt–1 + wt,
where A is a 2-by-2 matrix of coefficients. The error
term is also called the VAR’s innovation: It has a cer-
tain variance–covariance structure represented by a
matrix Q. The system in equation 5, which is called
the reduced form of the structural system in equations
1 and 2, can be used to represent the relation between
the variables in the vector X.
Almost all of the literature focuses on the matri-
ces A and Q of an autoregression of variables such as
inflation, output, and the interest rate. The matrix A is
the systematic component, while the matrix Q corre-
sponds to the disturbances affecting the system. One
representation of the information contained in A is the
“impulse response function,” which traces out the re-
sponse of a variable in the vector X to a (by definition
unexpected) movement in the corresponding element
of the vector w.
Thinking about monetary policy as set by a Taylor
rule fits well with the VAR framework, because mon-
etary policy is simply one of the equations in the VAR,
as long as interest rates, output, and inflation are among
the variables in the vector. Questions about monetary
policy are framed as questions about the parameters
of a Taylor rule, or the corresponding equation of a
VAR, without trying to model the motives or behavior
of the central bank.12
A major difficulty in using the VAR framework
is the interpretation of the innovation term. Suppose
that ut and vt are “true” exogenous disturbances, say,
the former shocks to policy (shifts in policymakers’
preferences, mistakes in execution) and the latter shocks
affecting the economy’s structure. We are really inter-
ested in the properties of u and v, not those of w. Un-
fortunately, we cannot recover u and v from w. The
reason is that the structural model, equations 1 and 2,
has more parameters (the coefficients a, b, c, d, e, and
f, the variances of u and v, and the covariance of u
with v; a total of nine) than the reduced form model
in equation 5 (the four coefficients of the matrix A
and the three coefficients of the matrix Q).
To identify the VAR, one can make assumptions
about the structural relations between the variables,
that is, about the parameters of the structural model.
There are a variety of possible identification schemes,
but they all tend to equate the number of estimated
parameters with the number of structural parameters.
In this instance, we might decide that inflation does
not react contemporaneously to output (a = 0) and that
u is not correlated with v. This reduces the number of
unknowns to seven, for which we have seven estimated
parameters. Having solved for the parameters, we
can recover the history of disturbances u and v.
With an identified VAR, it becomes possible to
do more than summarize the dynamic relations between
the variables. If one is confident of having correctly
identified the fundamental disturbances, one can speak
of causation and of policy responses to exogenous
shocks. One can also evaluate the importance of changes
in policy, by carrying out counterfactual exercises:
go back in time, replace the actual matrix A with the
changed matrix A, and compute the resulting response
of the variables to the known history of disturbances.
Such a procedure runs afoul of the Lucas critique, but
is nevertheless used in the literature to give a quantita-
tive idea of how much a change in policy can explain
a change in a variable’s behavior.42 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Has policy changed?
Taylor rules
The most straightforward way to approach the
question of whether policy has changed is to estimate
a Taylor rule and examine if the coefficients have
changed. This is what Taylor (1999) did when he an-
alyzed a century of U.S. monetary policy. For the post-
war period, Taylor’s ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions of the fed funds rate on output gap and
inflation showed that there was a substantial difference
in policy before and after 1980, with coefficients on
output and inflation being 0.25 and 0.81, respective-
ly, before 1980, and 0.76 and 1.53 after 1980. The
coefficients on each deviation represent how sensi-
tive the Fed is to variations in inflation and output.
A variant appears in Favero and Rovelli (2003),
who estimate a model in which the central bank has a
quadratic loss function in inflation, the output gap, and
interest rates (a form of preferences that is known to
simply generate a Taylor rule policy function), which
it minimizes subject to the constraints posed by two
reduced-form equations embodying the economy’s
behavior. They estimate the inflation target to have
fallen by half after 1980 and also find an increase in
preference for smooth interest rates; but they do not
find the relative weight of the output gap to have
changed significantly.
It is not enough to find that policy has changed:
Has it changed in a way that explains the rise and fall
of inflation? Here, the sensitivity to inflation is key,
because the instrument (the fed funds rate) is a nomi-
nal rate. If the Fed’s reaction to expected inflation is
more than one-for-one, then the real short-term rate
(the fed funds rate less inflation) will rise when infla-
tion rises, thereby curbing real activity and pushing
inflation down. Such a reaction function is stabilizing.
But if the reaction is less than one-for-one, as Taylor
found to be the case before 1980, the Fed ends up
stimulating the economy even as inflation is expect-
ed to rise, leading to further rises in inflation and po-
tential instability. This mechanism provides a way for
a change in the Taylor rule to explain the movements
in inflation.
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) pursue this lead,
in two ways. They assess the change in monetary policy
in a more satisfactory formulation and rigorously for-
malize the intuition that certain policies can lead to
instability. The Taylor rule they estimate is an inter-
est rate smoothing, forward-looking Taylor rule. The
rule is forward-looking because expected inflation
rather than current inflation is being monitored. This,
however, makes it depend on something that we do
not observe, namely inflation expectations. How can
one estimate a rule that depends on an unobservable?
We do observe what the rule prescribed each time,
and we also observe what inflation turned out to be
each time. So, for any choice of parameters (targets,
sensitivity to deviations), we can compute what rate
the rule would have prescribed had actual inflation
been known in advance. Assuming that the Fed makes
the best possible forecast of inflation, its inflation fore-
cast errors should be unpredictable (otherwise it is
not making the best available forecast); so the devia-
tions of the rule’s prescription from what it should
have been, had the Fed known actual inflation in ad-
vance, should also be unpredictable. We can then look
for the parameter values that make the rule’s prescrip-
tion (had inflation been known) deviate in the least
predictable way from what the Fed actually did.
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler proceed to estimate the
Fed’s policy rule separately over two samples, before
and after Volcker’s appointment in 1979. Their results
are striking—the sensitivity to inflation nearly triples
after Volcker’s appointment. Furthermore, that coef-
ficient was slightly less than one before, and about
two after. This difference, which they find to be ro-
bust to various modeling changes, is significant in the
context of an economic model that they develop to
formalize the intuition presented above. Sufficiently
reactive monetary policy stabilizes the economy, while
a passive policy (a coefficient less than one) leaves
the economy open to self-fulfilling prophecies. Sup-
pose that the public’s inflation expectations can be a
“sunspot;” then, with a passive policy, higher expect-
ed inflation leads the Fed to stimulate the economy,
leading to a confirmation of the expectation.13
The argument is still not conclusive, however. The
Taylor rule has changed from passive to active, and
there is a plausible model in which such a change would
eliminate instabilities. But surely such instabilities
would have observable consequences? There is much
information in the data that is not used by Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler’s univariate estimation. Lubik and
Schorfheide (2003) use it by explicitly taking into
account the possibility of instabilities with Bayesian
methods.14 They also emphasize that a passive mone-
tary policy has two sorts of consequences relative to
an active one: It opens up the possibility of self-fulfill-
ing prophecies, but it can also modify the way in which
shocks are propagated. They estimate the parameters
of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler’s economic model, al-
lowing a priori for determinacy or indeterminacy. They
broadly confirm their findings, although they are un-
able to resolve the question of whether the post-
Volcker stability resulted from a change in the response
of the economy or in the elimination of sunspots,43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
both potential consequences of the change to an ac-
tivist policy.
The Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) result has
prompted a number of responses. One, by Orphanides
(2003), was to repeat the exercise, but with a differ-
ent dataset, namely the data available at the time to
policymakers, as found in the Federal Reserve Board
staff analyses (the “green books”). He finds broad simi-
larities in policy over the two periods. In particular,
the coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule is not much
changed. Instead, he finds that policy was too activist
in response to an output gap that was itself systemati-
cally mismeasured. The mismeasurement is apparent
when we compare the green book output gaps with
an output gap computed from the whole sample now
available to us, as a deviation from trend (obviously
information that policymakers did not have in real time).
As it turns out, the (mismeasured) output gap was
negatively correlated with the inflation forecast (–0.5),
but the (true) output gap is not. The Fed was actively
trying to stimulate an economy that it saw as under-
performing, but doing so typically when inflation
was already high. As a result, in the Clarida–Galí–
Gertler exercise with actual data, reactions to the out-
put gap are misattributed as wrongheaded reactions
to inflation, and the Fed ends up looking passive with
respect to inflation even though it was not. This, ar-
gues Orphanides, also explains the stop–go cycles of
the 1970s as pursuit of an overoptimistic output target
fueled inflation, leading to sudden tightening in response.
There are two difficulties with these findings,
both related to the output gap. One is Taylor’s (2002)
claim that policymakers in practice did not pay much
attention to this measure of the output gap. The other,
which may be related, is that such mismeasurements
of the output gap (by up to 10 percent) persisting for
years throughout the 1970s are difficult to believe. True,
the U.S. economy underwent a productivity slowdown
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which no one an-
ticipated and anyone computing output gaps based on
the earlier, higher productivity trend would have over-
estimated. But it would not take ten years or more to
realize the mistake, and the slowdown was already
being debated in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see
Nordhaus, 1972).
VARs
The other series of findings for changes in policy
comes from the VAR literature. One broad approach
is to estimate coefficients in a VAR and look for changes
or breaks between periods of time. Another approach
is to build a statistical model that explicitly allows
for changes in the coefficients and see how much
change transpires in the data.
Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002) study the ques-
tion of a change in parameters for both output15 and
the Consumer Price Index (inflation). They perform a
battery of tests. First, they use procedures to detect
multiple breakpoints in time-series, that is, points in
time where the mean of the series could have changed.
For inflation, they find breaks in 1973, 1978, and
1981.16 They analyze several vector autoregressions,
varying by the list of variables included as well as
the frequency of the data. In unrestricted VARs, they
test for coefficient stability and for constancy of error
variances. In identified VARs,17 they once again test
for changes in coefficients as well as changes in the
variance of the innovations. They find strong evidence
of structural breaks in all three models and reduced
volatility of monetary policy shock and fundamental
output shock. The volatility of inflation shock remains
the same in the quarterly model but decreases in the
monthly model.
Cogley and Sargent (2001) represent the next stage.
Rather than estimating a model with constant coeffi-
cients and determining whether it is rejected by the
data, they try to model the extent to which there has
been variation in the parameters. Their inspiration is
Lucas’s (1976) discussion of drift or repeated chang-
es made in the supposedly stable parameters of the
large-scale macroeconomic models that were in use
at the time and Sargent’s (1999) interpretation of that
drift. Consequently, they consider a Bayesian VAR
of output, unemployment, and the short-term nomi-
nal interest rate, in which some parameters are explic-
itly allowed to vary over time. The coefficients of the
VAR are allowed to vary over time as random walks,
and the stochastic structure of the innovations is kept
invariant. They find significant changes in the coeffi-
cients. In particular, they examine the coefficients of
the policy equation, and, in the spirit of Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler, they compute a measure of activism, re-
flecting whether the stance of monetary policy is accom-
modative or not. They find that it is accommodative
from 1973 to 1980, but not in the earlier and later pe-
riods. However, their measure of activism reflects
dispersed beliefs on those periods, indicating a fair
amount of uncertainty as to the degree of activism.
Has luck changed?
Early proponents of the bad-luck (or Princeton18)
view have proposed specific candidates for the sources
of the bad luck. Blinder (1982) and Hamilton (1983)
point to the importance of oil shocks to the economy
in the 1970s. But DeLong (1997) and Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler (2000) have cast doubt on their importance
for inflation itself, pointing to the timing discrepancies.44 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Inflation took off well before the 1973 oil shock and
again before the 1979 shock; conversely, it fell dras-
tically while oil prices remained very high until 1985.
They also doubt that the oil shock of 1973 on its own
could have caused sustained inflation for a decade with-
out major help from an accommodative monetary
policy; if anything, the oil-induced recessions dampened
the inflationary effect of the oil shocks themselves.
Also, as DeLong notes, unlike the GDP deflator, wage
growth is not affected by oil price shocks. Barsky and
Kilian (2001) have noted the dramatic surge in the price
of other industrial commodities that preceded the 1973
oil shock and have shown that a model can explain
the bulk of stagflation by monetary expansions and
contractions without reference to supply shocks.
The more recent work does not try to identify what
exact piece of bad luck is to blame. Instead, it tries to
identify changes over time in the exogenous sources of
fluctuations that affect the economy. One way to do this
is to estimate a statistical model that posits no change
and test for changes in the parameters. Another way is
to explicitly model the process of change in the shocks.
The first type of analysis is exemplified by
Bernanke and Mihov (1998a, 1998b), who offered
indirect evidence by arguing that parameters of the
Fed’s reaction function did not change. The general
aim of their paper is to provide a useful statistical model
of the Fed that spans the whole period, and in partic-
ular to determine which choice of policy variables (fed
funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, total reserves) and
which model of the relations between these variables
best represent the Fed’s behavior. They test for breaks,
or abrupt changes in the coefficients of the VAR, and
don’t find any, although they do find changes in the
variance–covariance matrix of the innovations to the
policy variables.19
The Cogley–Sargent results suggest strongly that
changes in policy were substantial. In his discussion
of their paper, Sims (2001b) argued that estimated
changes in the coefficients may in fact result from a
misspecification of the innovations as having a con-
stant variance. What happens if one explicitly models
changes in luck, that is, in the stochastic nature of the
shocks affecting the economy? This approach has
been taken in a series of papers by Sims (1999, 2001a)
and Sims and Zha (2002). In the context of a VAR,
the papers ask how well a model of monetary policy
(and eventually the economy) will fit the data when
its parameters are explicitly allowed to vary over
time in a stochastic way. All three papers share a
common modeling of this stochastic dependence.20
In Sims (1999), the model posits the short-term
interest rate as a function of six of its lags and those
of a commodity price index. The parameters of the
model (coefficients, intercept, and variance of error
term) are allowed to change over time in the follow-
ing way. Sims posits three possible regimes, to which
three sets of parameters correspond. Transition from
one regime to the next is random and follows a Markov
process, in which the probabilities of being in any re-
gime next month are only a function of the current
regime. The process is restricted in that state 1 can
only be followed by state 1 or state 2, and state 3 by
state 2 or state 3. He then estimates the three sets of
parameters and the probabilities of switching from
one regime to the other.21 Of course, the statistical
procedure is free to produce no differences between
the three regimes or differences only in the coefficients
of the linear model.
As it turns out, Sims finds significant differences
among the three regimes. One regime has a high average
level of interest rates, but policy is not very responsive
to inflation and the shocks have a low variance. The
next regime has a lower average level of rates but more
responsive rates and greater variance in the shocks;
likewise the third regime. The third regime, with the
coefficient on commodity prices eight times higher
than in the first regime, is found to occur rarely and
not to last very long. Policy doesn’t react much to
temporary movements in prices in normal times, but
as they appear more likely to be persistent it reacts
more strongly.
In Sims (2001a), the model is extended to include
a measure of output (industrial production) alongside
inflation in the estimated reaction function. The short-
term interest rate depends on six lags of itself and on
the three-month change in prices and output. The ex-
ogenous variation in coefficients and variances of inno-
vations is restricted: It takes the form of two independent
Markov chains, one for the coefficients and one for the
variances. The model with the best fit shows monetary
policy alternating randomly between two states, a
“smoothing” regime and an “activist” regime. The
activist regime occurs throughout the sample period,
not more often before or after 1980; and it lasts only
a few months.
Sims and Zha (2002) considerably generalize the
statistical model. They use 12 lags and more variables:
In addition to the fed funds rate and the commodity
price index, they include the Consumer Price Index,
GDP, unemployment, and M2 (a broad measure of
money), a broader set than most of the other work in
this literature. In terms of the time variation of the coef-
ficients, they consider a variety of models (still driven
by a Markov process), whose fit they compare. The
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change, but only the coefficients in the monetary pol-
icy equation change. They find, in line with Sims
(1999, 2001a) that one state corresponds to a highly
active Fed, but occurs only in the middle of the period
(particularly during 1979 to 1982 when the Fed was
targeting reserves). They find little difference between
the other two regimes, whether by looking at the im-
pulse response functions or running counterfactuals.
A related line of work has analyzed the statisti-
cal properties of inflation alone, in particular its de-
gree of persistence. Sargent (1999) attaches a good
deal of importance to persistence of inflation, where
it plays a key role in the learning story, although it is
not central to the contention that policy (as a response
to other variables) has changed over time. Neverthe-
less, Pivetta and Reis (2003) try to revisit Cogley and
Sargent (2001) with a univariate model of inflation,
which is a VAR with only one variable. In such a frame-
work, “persistence” (or long-run predictability) comes
down to some function of the impulse response func-
tion, which describes the impact of a shock on all
subsequent values of a variable. They find that their
different measures of persistence do not vary much
over the period. They also compute the Bayesian an-
alogue of confidence intervals, which they find to be
very wide. Classical (non-Bayesian) methods yield
similar results. Their results are difficult to compare
because of the univariate framework they adopt, but
have been taken as evidence for the bad-luck view.
Have both policy and luck changed?
It is possible that both policy and luck changed
to some extent. Some of the most recent research
seems to tend in that direction.
In response to criticisms leveled by Stock (2001)
and Sims (2001b) to their earlier work, Cogley and
Sargent (2003) allow for both forms of variations, co-
efficients and stochastic structure. Specifically, the vari-
ances of the VAR innovations follow a geometric
random walk.22 As for the first question, they find
changes over time both in the stochastic disturbances
affecting the system and in the coefficients of the system.
The variance of the VAR innovations rises to 1981 and
falls thereafter. But the coefficients change as well,
and their earlier results are qualitatively the same.
Cogley and Sargent also attempt to respond to the
evidence of the opposite camp, and ask: How can the
Bernanke–Mihov results of no change in coefficients
be reconciled with their findings? Bernanke and Mihov
test a null hypothesis of no change in policy against
an alternative of a sudden break. As in all statistical
tests, a failure to reject the null hypothesis is strong
evidence against an alternative only if the statistic’s
behavior would be markedly different under that al-
ternative. The Cogley–Sargent alternative is not one
of a one-time break, but rather of drift in coefficients.
Using simulated data, they show that the test used by
Bernanke and Mihov has low power against their al-
ternative, that is, the test cannot distinguish their al-
ternative of slow change from the null hypothesis of no
change. They examine several other tests, and the one
that does well against their alternative simulations re-
jects the null hypothesis of no change in the data.
In broad outline, then, the literature is beginning
to find common ground, in that both luck and policy
have changed. There remain a number of unresolved
questions. Even if both changed, which change is more
significant? And, if policy did change, why did it do so?
How much?
The quantitative question of which change is more
significant can be addressed in the VAR framework
with counterfactuals. Suppose one has estimated an
identified VAR, that is, one where “Nature’s hid causes”
are known.23 A counterfactual exercise can help as-
sess what would have happened if the policy of one
period had been confronted with the luck of another
period. This is done by applying the estimated coeffi-
cients of one period in response to the shocks of the
other period and seeing how unconditional variance
has changed. Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2001) do
carry out counterfactuals, and find that 85 percent to
90 percent of the decline in volatility in inflation
comes from change in coefficients.
Boivin and Giannoni (2003) use a VAR method-
ology as well, but their VAR representation of the vari-
ables derives from an economic model, so that the
coefficients and innovations of the VAR can be relat-
ed to the parameters of the economic model. Further-
more, they distinguish parameters of the central bank’s
policy function (which they posit to be a forward-
looking Taylor rule) from policy-invariant parame-
ters (preferences and technology) and try to find out
which changed. The estimation method is one of in-
direct inference, in which the parameters are selected
so as to make the behavior of the model economy’s
variables mimic as closely as possible that of the data
(as represented by the impulse response functions). With
this different approach, Boivin and Giannoni find that
the responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation has
increased by 60 percent after 1980, but they also find that
the non-policy parameters have changed. Using their
economic model, they perform counterfactual exercis-
es and find that the fall in responsiveness is due to
changes in policy rather than changes in the economy.46 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Consensus has not been achieved, however.
Primiceri (2003) uses a structural VAR approach that
extends Cogley and Sargent by allowing for time-vary-
ing correlations between the innovations in the VAR.
He finds (as Cogley and Sargent did) that the variances
of the disturbances changed considerably over time,
rising in the 1970s and early 1980s and then falling.
The long-run cumulative response of interest rates to
inflation shocks, while showing some variation over
time, does not confirm the Clarida Galí and Gertler
result of a pre-Volcker unstable Taylor rule. Finally,
he conducts a counterfactual and finds that using the
policy parameters of the Greenspan era would have
made virtually no difference to inflation in the 1970s.
The work of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) points
to an interesting interaction between luck and policy.
As they show, bad (that is, passive monetary) policy
can lead to instability in the economic system, partly
because the reaction of the economy to shocks will
be weaker, partly because of the possibility of sunspots.
The switch from passive to active policy may change
the behavior of the economy, it may also prevent ex-
traneous randomness from affecting it; in other words,
it may reduce the part that bad luck can play. This
poses some challenges for any attempt at quantifying
the relative contributions of bad policy and bad luck;
Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) make significant progress
in addressing those challenges, but are unable to de-
termine unambiguously how much of the reduction
in volatility comes from the elimination of sunspots.24
Why did policy change?
The deeper, and in some sense more qualitative,
question, is: Why did policy change? Here again,
consensus remains elusive, because there is no agreed
empirical model of government behavior that would
provide an explanation. Although essentially statistical
in nature, the Cogley–Sargent and Sims–Zha papers
reveal very different theories of government behavior.
Recall that Cogley and Sargent (2003) estimate a
statistical model of change in policy and luck, which
allows them to describe the pattern of change over the
course of time. Although their model is purely statis-
tical (and in particular does not articulate a theory of
government behavior), it allows them to measure the
evolution of policy over time and characterize it in
ways that make contact with the theories of Sargent
(1999). They do so by presenting the behavior over
time of several statistical objects that a government
in Sargent’s (1999) model would care about. Such
are long-run forecasts of inflation and unemployment
at each point in time, which the authors interpret as
“core” measures of these variables. They also measure
how much of the variation in inflation comes from
short-run versus long-run variations.
These objects display a similar pattern, roughly
timed with the three acts of DeLong’s drama. Inflation
and unemployment are low in the 1960s, rise to the
late 1970s, and fall again. Inflation persistence rises and
falls in the same way. This lends general support to the
bad-policy view. Cogley and Sargent also perform
Solow–Tobin tests of the natural rate hypothesis at
various points in time. They find that it is rejected un-
til 1972 and accepted after that, with however a mar-
gin of acceptance slowly declining since 1980, a trend
that underlines the risk of “recidivism” or ceding again
to temptation of high inflation. This may appear broad-
ly consistent with the partial learning story of Sargent,
although Sims (2001b) notes that the early date at
which the natural rate hypothesis ceases to be rejected
poses a difficulty: Bad policy should not have lasted
until 1980.
The Sims–Zha line of work appears to agree that
there was a change in policy. The type of change, how-
ever, is of a peculiar nature. When regimes are governed
by a Markov chain of the kind they use, fundamental
or permanent change such as the one suggested by
the conventional story is, in effect, ruled out. If the
model fits (and, naturally, the data is always free to
reject it), it will represent changes in policy as back-
and-forth fluctuations between regimes, with any re-
gime likely to return at some future point. This explains
how Sims (1999) can find that there has “by and large
been continuity in American monetary policy, albeit
with alternation between periods of erratic, aggressive
reaction to the state of the economy and periods of more
predictable and less aggressive response” (see a simi-
lar conclusion in Sims and Zha, 2002, where the ag-
gressive policy is concentrated in the 1979–82 period).
Sims and Zha do not justify their Markov structure
in terms of a model of government behavior, although
one is tempted to think back to the “Lucas critique
taken seriously” line of reasoning. Primiceri (2003)
has argued that restricting changes in parameter values
to take the form of sudden jumps may not be suitable
where aggregation takes place over large numbers of
agents, and where expectations and learning may play
a role in agents’ behavior. Such factors tend to smooth
the observable responses, even if the underlying changes
are abrupt.
Conclusion
The conventional view of the rise and fall of in-
flation in the U.S. is based on central bankers making
mistakes and learning from them. This view has been
supported with considerable narrative and anecdotal47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
evidence, but providing an empirical confirmation
has proven difficult. Considerable statistical expertise
has been brought to bear on the question. It seems
well established now that policy has changed signifi-
cantly over time, but that the shocks buffeting the
U.S. economy were of a different nature in the 1970s.
How much of the inflation of that decade is at-
tributable to changes in policy versus changes in luck
is not settled, although the evidence so far leans to-
ward the former. The Taylor rule approach has em-
phasized the potential for destabilizing monetary
policy and found evidence that policy was indeed too
passive in the 1970s. As to the reasons for the chang-
es in policy, there are intriguing theories, although
none has reached the point where it can confront the
data. Yet if we are to apportion blame (or praise)
among the central bank administrations in figure 1,
we need a method for doing so. But, whereas macro-
economics has developed standard ways to model the
private sector, we lack an agreed framework in which
to model how policy is made.48 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1The Vietnam War and various social programs launched at the
time may have contributed some fiscal pressure to the monetary
loosening that followed.
2I use Federal Reserve Board chairmen as eponyms of the succes-
sive monetary and fiscal policies. This is rather unfair, and a read-
ing of Romer and Romer (2002) leaves one less than convinced
that Martin actually believed in the Samuelson–Solow menu.
3Romer and Romer (2002) also search for clues in official pro-
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4See a more detailed discussion of these points by Professors X
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5The Humphrey–Hawkins Act, passed at about that time, directed
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6Remember that the trade-off between surprise inflation and un-
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7Cogley, Morozov, and Sargent (2003), however, find an inverse
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sector’s expectations. They are what they are. If the central bank
keeps disinflating, it will keep being punished for violating ex-
pectations; since that is too costly, the central bank doesn’t disinflate,
and the expectations are validated.
9Pangloss was Voltaire’s satirical incarnation of Leibniz, who argued
that our world is the outcome of a maximization problem under
constraints we don’t know, and however bad the outcome seems
to us at times, we should trust the Great Maximizer in the Sky.
10See, for example, Velde and Veracierto (2000) to see how much
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11This is modeled by having the policymaker use something other
than least-squares estimation. The reason for this departure is that
least-squares estimation will bring the policymaker right back to
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to exploit the Phillips curve and systematically expected to do so
by the private sector.
12An exception is Favero and Rovelli (2003).
13The simulations with the calibrated model show a positive cor-
relation between output and inflation. That is, the stimulus pro-
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show that, in a version of their model without sunspots, adverse
supply shocks lead to lower output but relatively high inflation.
Christiano and Gust (2000) present a different model of the
economy, which does generate stagflation as a result of self-ful-
filling prophecies, relying on a different mechanism for generat-
ing real effects of monetary policy.
14Bayesian methods allow the econometrician to express beliefs
about a range of possible parameter values (including passive and
active policy) and to formulate to what extent the data confirm or
revise these beliefs.
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